The paper is devoted to indication and critique of myths functioning in the Polish science and practice of law in connection with the problems of interpretation. By “myths” author refers to statements which are false or unsupported by sufficient evidence, or directives that are not supported by socially approved values. These myths are damaging the process of applying the law. These include: (1) allowing the “direct” understanding of legal text, (2) contrasting the “direct” understanding of a text and the situation of its interpretation, (3) adhering to the maxim of clara non sunt interpretanda, (4) recognizing this maxim as “eternal”, (5) recognizing that this maxim accelerates the process of applying the law, (6) believing that legal texts are written in a colloquial language, (7) adopting of a “presumption of a colloquial language”, (8) restricting to the use of just one dictionary, (9) not taking into consideration that legal texts are written on a descriptive level and read at a directive level, (10) treating “methods” of interpretation as competing with each other, (11) identification of the chronology of the directives with their significance, (12) recommending the use of the directive interpretatio cessat in claris, (13) preventing the overcoming by the extra-linguistic methods the linguistic interpretation, (14) limiting the interpretation to the functional method, (15) inadequate understanding of the principle of rationality of the legislature, (16) differentiating of interpretation in “difficult cases”, (17) not differentiating rules of interpretation of European law and internal law, (18) inappropriate justification for interpretation decisions.